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In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be
incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent
those situations where, due to lack of information, the decision maker would like to maintain different
options alive and defer the final decision. In particular, a new axiomatization is given which turns out
to be a weakening of the classical set of axioms used in Decision Theory. Preliminary results show
how preferences involving complex distributions are related to judgments on single alternatives.
1 Introduction
In his pioneering work on Decision Theory [4], when delineating the fundamental properties of a prefer-
ence relation ≺, Savage makes the following point: given two potential outcomes f and g, it cannot be
the case that f ≺ g and g ≺ f at the same time. Clearly, this is logically equivalent to saying that either
f 6≺ g or g 6≺ f , which leads to three possible cases: (i) f 6≺ g and g ≺ f , (ii) f ≺ g and g 6≺ f , or (iii)
f 6≺ g and g 6≺ f . Then, he postulates that these three cases are the only possible judgments concerning
f and g. In particular, the last case ( f 6≺ g and g 6≺ f ) allegedly implies that f and g are equivalent in the
sense that in any situation wherein these are the only two possible options, the decision maker does not
mind delegating to coin flipping. Consequently, in classical Decision Theory (CDT) a very fundamental
property of a preference relation is its totality.
From the theory’s very start, the hidden assumptions underlying this model of an economic man
raised some criticisms, one of the most influential of which being due to Simon:
“This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which,
if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also
to have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that
enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which
of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale” [5].
In recent years, the massive development of e-commerce services makes Simon’s criticisms even
more cogent and the classical viewpoint on the economic man more and more idealistic. Often prefer-
ences result from complex trade-offs between different attributes (functionalities, cost, Quality of Service
(QoS), information disclosure risks, etc.) sometimes the user has only a vague idea of. Moreover, in some
cases the user actually consists of a group of persons where internal debate does not easily end up with
a total preference. Finally, from a computer-science perspective, our aim could be to develop a software
agent that acts in an electronic market on behalf of a real user. As we discuss in Section 2, even if the
user conforms with the classical economic man, her preference relation could be so complex that it could
not be entirely and efficiently injected into the software agent.
Differently from Simon, who moved towards a problem-solving perspective, in this work we chal-
lenge CDT on its playground. In particular, we provide an alternative axiomatization where two out-
comes, due to the lack of information or an irreducible heterogeneity of the attributes involved, can also
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be incomparable. In Section 2, we show two motivating scenarios where considering preferences as in-
complete seems to be appropriate. In Section 3, we introduce the new axiomatization by emphasizing
which axioms of CDT remain the same and which axioms should be replaced. The resulting theory, that
we call Partial Decision Theory, consists in a weakening of CDT, that is, all the properties it satisfies are
satisfied by CDT as well (but not vice versa). In Section 3, we show some general features of the new
axiomatization; in particular, we argue that the proposed framework is not too weak, as it retains several
desirable properties of CDT. Conclusions and future works end the paper.
2 Motivating Scenarios
In this section we introduce two scenarios where partial preferences seem to provide a more natural way
to describe a decision maker, or a software agent behaving on its behalf, than total preferences.
In the first scenario, Bob wants to learn to play the piano and posts a request on a consumer-to-
consumer social network. Soon after, he receives offers from two musicians, Carl and Mary. Carl
provides two options: a 5 people class for 15 dollars per person or a one-to-one class for 35 dollars.
Mary offers two similar options: a 3 people class for 20 dollars per person or a one-to-one class for 40
dollars. Furthermore, they both offer a trial lesson. Regarding Carl’s options, Bob thinks that 5 people
are too many for a class, thus he prefers the one-to-one option. On the contrary, he judges the price
difference between Mary’s options somewhat excessive, hence he prefers the 3 people class. If someone
asks Bob “Do you prefer Mary’s 3 people class or Carl’s one-to-one class?”, Bob will probably answer
“I do not know, I first have to attend the trial lessons”. Notice that this is different from saying that the
two options are equivalent, because in that case Bob would simply flip a coin and choose one of them.
On the contrary, it is more natural to think that these options are initially incomparable and Bob will use
the trial lessons to disambiguate them.
More generally, in absence of complete information it might be difficult for an individual to figure
out a coherent total order over the bids and choose in a single step one of them. On the contrary, making
a decision can be viewed as a multiple step process where offers are initially filtered according to a
partial preference relation. Then, depending on the resulting offers, an individual can acquire further
information and possibly rank them.
In the second scenario, Alice’s father has finally agreed to buy her a smartphone, and now she is
browsing Ebay for possible offers. Unfortunately, the list is huge and patience is not Alice’s forte. So,
she would like to be assisted by a software agent to filter out undesired options. The software agent
accepts constraints such as maximum cost and size, color restrictions, etc., and also a preference relation
as a total order over bids. Then, according to the specified preference relation, the agent returns the
best offer. Clearly, Alice’s desires are influenced by several attributes such as operating system, color,
weight, brand, and so on. For instance, she has a preference over operating systems in the following
decreasing order: OS1, OS2 and OS3; over colors: blue, red, black, white; and over brands: Brand1,
Brand2, Brand3. Furthermore, out of benevolence for her father, given a specific model the cheaper the
better. However, such preferences over single attributes do not constitute a total order. Moreover, Alice
cannot establish a priority over attributes, for instance she prefers a Brand3 phone with operating system
OS1 to a Brand2 one with operating system OS2, but she prefers a Brand1 OS2 phone to a Brand2 OS1
one. Alice soon realizes that providing a total order to the software agent is frustrating and requires
about the same effort as comparing all the offers by herself. This scenario reveals the following issue: in
designing a software agent that behaves on behalf of real users, we have to take into account how users
can instruct the agent about their own preferences. In electronic markets where the number of offers
can be huge, it could be unfeasible to transfer an exact representation of users’ desires into a software
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agent. In this case, the agent should make do with an approximate representation of users’ desires as a
partial order and return a restricted list of choices from which the user can select the preferred one. As
a further advantage, the user retains the ability of applying unforeseen, situation-specific knowledge and
preferences that had not been formalized in advance.
3 Partial Preferences
Let ∆(A ) be the class of all probability distributions over a countable set of alternatives A . Given two
probability distributions f ,g ∈ ∆(A ) and α ∈ [0,1], we denote by 〈α , f ,g〉 the convex combination of f
and g such that 〈α , f ,g〉(a) = α f (a)+ (1−α)g(a), for all a ∈A . Moreover, for an alternative a ∈A ,
[a] denotes the degenerate distribution that assigns probability 1 to a.
A preference relation  is a binary relation on ∆(A ), subject to the following classical Decision
Theory axioms: 1
1. f  g or g  f (totality);
2. if f  g and g  h, then f  h (transitivity);
3. if f ≺ g and 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1, then 〈β , f ,g〉 ≺ 〈α , f ,g〉;
4. if f1  g1, f2  g2, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then 〈α , f1, f2〉  〈α ,g1,g2〉;
5. if f1 ≺ g1, f2  g2, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then 〈α , f1, f2〉 ≺ 〈α ,g1,g2〉;
where, as usual, f ≺ g means that f  g and g 6 f .
Notice that the first two axioms force  to be a total (hence reflexive) transitive relation, i.e., a total
preorder (also called non-strict weak order). As shown by the previous scenarios, we advocate that in
several contexts some outcomes may be incomparable, meaning that  should be modeled as a (possibly
partial) preorder. For this reason, we weaken the totality axiom in favor of one which requires reflexivity
only:
1’. f  f ;
Having allowed for incomparable distributions, at first look it may seem that the deal is done. However,
the obtained theory is so weak that it contemplates unrealistic preferences. The problem is that the
previous axioms do not say anything about incomparable distributions which, once combined, can be
then freely judged. On the contrary, it is natural to think that, to some extent, the incomparability between
distributions persists also when they are combined.
Assume for example that f and g are incomparable and let 0≤ α < β ≤ 1. According to the axioms
above, it is possible that 〈α , f ,g〉 ≺ 〈β , f ,g〉. This looks inappropriate: given that I cannot compare f
and g, why should I strictly prefer one combination of f and g over another? This leads to a further
axiom:
6. if 0≤ α ≤ 1, and 〈α , f1, f2〉 ≺ 〈α ,g1,g2〉, then there exist j,k ∈ {1,2} such that f j ≺ gk.
Intuitively, a distribution f of the type 〈α , f1, f2〉 can be seen as a random choice (a.k.a. a lottery)
which picks f1 with probability α and f2 with probability 1−α . Comparing f with another distribution
g of the type 〈α ,g1,g2〉 encompasses comparing four possible draws: ( f1,g1), ( f1,g2), ( f2,g1), and
( f2,g2).2 If there is no draw in which the second component is strictly better than the second, Axiom 6
requires that g is not strictly preferred to f . Notice that one could easily come up with more stringent
1Here, we borrow the formulation presented in [3].
2With probabilities α2, α(1−α), α(1−α) and (1−α)2 , respectively.
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conditions on the persistence of incomparability, for instance by requiring that a majority of draws favors
the second component over the first one. We instead propose a rather weak requirement, in the form of
Axiom 6, which supports a wide range of preference relations, while still ensuring a number of interesting
properties, which are the subject of Section 4.
We call Partial Decision Theory (PDT) the new set of axioms 1’-6. Notice that Axiom 6 can be
easily derived in classical Decision Theory, consequently PDT is a weakening of classical Decision The-
ory, in the sense that all preference relations satisfying classical Decision Theory also satisfy PDT. The
converse does not hold, as witnessed by the “empty” preference relation, i.e., the relation that considers
incomparable all distinct distributions.
As seen above, Axiom 6 has been motivated by analyzing which preferences between f = 〈α , f1, f2〉
and g = 〈α ,g1,g2〉 are admissible on the basis of the preferences on the possible draws ( f1,g1), ( f1,g2),
( f2,g1), and ( f2,g2). In Table 1 we perform such an analysis extensively. In particular, for each entry,
the left-hand side ⊲⊳1 ⊲⊳2 ⊲⊳3 ⊲⊳4, with ⊲⊳∈ {∼,≺,≻, 6≶}, is a consistent combination f1 ⊲⊳1 g1, f1 ⊲⊳2 g2,
f2 ⊲⊳3 g1, and f2 ⊲⊳4 g2, whereas the right-hand side shows which preference relations between f and g
are consistent with PDT. For example, the first entry is the case f1 ∼ g1, f1 ∼ g2, f2 ∼ g1, and f2 ∼ g2,
then according with Axiom 4, f ∼ g is the only possibility. Conversely, in some other cases (e.g. ≺6≶≻6≶)
no axiom can be applied, consequently f can be in any relationship with g.
Table 1 provides a close look on how PDT behaves and hence it can be a good starting point to
debate whether and how it can be extended or modified. For example, notice that in some cases f and
g are comparable even if some of the underlying draws are not (e.g. due to Axiom 5, ≺6≶ 6≶∼ results
in f ≺ g). Somewhat conversely, f and g can be incomparable even if all the underlying draws are
comparable (e.g. ≺≻≺≻ admits f 6≶ g). Finally, f and g are never forced to be incomparable, even if
f1 6≶ g1, f1 6≶ g2, f2 6≶ g2, and f2 6≶ g2.
4 Properties of Partial Preferences
In the following, given two distributions f and g, we write f ∼ g for f  g and g  f (i.e., equivalence),
and we write f 6≶ g for f 6 g and g 6 f (i.e., incomparability). First, we show that two relevant properties
of classical Decision Theory continue to hold in PDT. Given two distributions f ,g∈∆(A ), we write f →
g in case there exist ε > 0 and two alternatives a1 and a2 such that (i) [a1]≺ [a2], (ii) g(a1) = f (a1)− ε ,
g(a2) = f (a2) + ε , and (iii) for all a 6= a1,a2, g(a) = f (a). When f → g, g can be obtained from f
by shifting a positive amount of probability from an alternative a1 to a strictly preferred alternative a2.
Then, denote by f ⇒ g the transitive closure of →.
Theorem 1 Let f ,g ∈ ∆(A ). If f ⇒ g then f ≺ g.
Proof. It suffices to show that f → g implies f ≺ g. Assume that for some a1 and a2, where [a1]≺ [a2],
there exists ε > 0 such that f (a1) = g(a1)+ ε and f (a2) = g(a2)− ε . Let γ = g(a1)+g(a2) = f (a1)+
f (a2), α = f (a2)γ and β = g(a2)γ . Then, g can be written as 〈γ ,g′,h〉 and f as 〈γ , f ′,h〉, where h is a
probability distribution such that h(a1) = h(a2) = 0, g′ = 〈β , [a2], [a1]〉 and f ′ = 〈α , [a2], [a1]〉. Since
[a1]≺ [a2] and α < β , Axiom 3 implies that f ′ ≺ g′. Then, due to Axiom 5, f ≺ g.
Another property that can be proved in PDT is that if each alternative coming out from a distribution f
is dominated by all the alternatives from g, then f  g. Preliminarily, given a distribution f ∈ ∆(A ),
the support of f , supp( f ) = {a ∈ A | f (a) > 0}, is the set of alternatives to which f assigns positive
probability.
Theorem 2 Let f ,g ∈ ∆(A ) be such that, for all a ∈ supp( f ) and a′ ∈ supp(g), [a] [a′]. Then, f  g.
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∼∼∼∼ ∼ ∼∼≺≺ ≺ ∼∼≻≻ ≻ ∼∼6≶ 6≶ ∼ 6≶
∼≺∼≺ ≺ ∼≺≺≺ ≺ ∼≺≻∼ ∼ ∼≺≻≺ ≺
∼≺≻≻ ≻ ∼≺≻6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ∼≺6≶≺ ≺ ∼≺6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶
∼≻∼≻ ≻ ∼≻≺∼ ∼ ∼≻≺≺ ≺ ∼≻≺≻ ≻
∼≻≺6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ∼≻≻≻ ≻ ∼≻6≶≻ ≻ ∼≻6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶
∼6≶∼6≶ ∼ 6≶ ∼6≶≺≺ ≺ ∼6≶≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ∼6≶≻≻ ≻
∼6≶≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ∼6≶ 6≶∼ ∼ ∼6≶ 6≶≺ ≺ ∼6≶ 6≶≻ ≻
∼6≶ 6≶ 6≶ ∼ 6≶ ≺∼∼≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺∼≺∼ ≺ ≺∼≺≺ ≺
≺∼≺≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺∼≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺∼≻≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺∼6≶≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺∼6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺≺∼∼ ≺ ≺≺∼≺ ≺ ≺≺∼≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺≺∼6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺≺≺∼ ≺ ≺≺≺≺ ≺ ≺≺≺≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺≺≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺≺≻∼ ≺ ≺≺≻≺ ≺ ≺≺≻≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺≺≻6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺≺6≶∼ ≺ ≺≺6≶≺ ≺ ≺≺6≶≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺≺6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺≻∼≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺≻≺∼ ≺ ≺≻≺≺ ≺
≺≻≺≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺≻≺6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺≻≻≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺≻6≶≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺≻6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺6≶∼≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺6≶∼6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺6≶≺∼ ≺
≺6≶≺≺ ≺ ≺6≶≺≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺6≶≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≺6≶≻≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺6≶≻6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≺6≶ 6≶∼ ≺ ≺6≶ 6≶≺ ≺ ≺6≶ 6≶≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≺6≶ 6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ ≻∼∼≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻∼≺≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻∼≻∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶
≻∼≻≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻∼≻≻ ≻ ≻∼≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻∼6≶≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≻∼6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻≺∼≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≺≺≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≺≻∼ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≻≺≻≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≺≻≻ ≻ ≻≺≻6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≺6≶≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≻≺6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻∼∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻∼≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻∼≻ ≻
≻≻∼6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻≺∼ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻≺≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻≺≻ ≻
≻≻≺6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻≻∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻≻≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻≻≻ ≻
≻≻≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻6≶∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻6≶≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻≻6≶≻ ≻
≻≻6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶∼≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶∼6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶≺≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
≻6≶≺6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶≻∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶≻≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶≻≻ ≻
≻6≶≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶ 6≶∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶ 6≶≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ ≻6≶ 6≶≻ ≻
≻6≶ 6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶∼∼6≶ ∼ 6≶ 6≶∼≺≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶∼≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶∼≻≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶∼≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶∼6≶∼ ∼ 6≶ 6≶∼6≶≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶∼6≶≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶∼6≶ 6≶ ∼ 6≶ 6≶≺∼≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶≺∼6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶≺≺≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶≺≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶≺≻∼ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≺≻≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
6≶≺≻≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≺≻6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≺6≶∼ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶≺6≶≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶≺6≶≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≺6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶≻∼≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻∼6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶
6≶≻≺∼ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻≺≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻≺≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻≺6≶ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
6≶≻≻≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻6≶∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻6≶≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
6≶≻6≶≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶≻6≶ 6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶∼∼ ∼ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶∼≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶ 6≶∼≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶∼6≶ ∼ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≺∼ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≺≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶ 6≶≺≻ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≺6≶ ∼ ≺ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≻∼ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≻≺ ∼ ≺ ≻ 6≶
6≶ 6≶≻≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≻6≶ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶∼ ∼ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶≺ ∼ ≺ 6≶
6≶ 6≶ 6≶≻ ∼ ≻ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶ 6≶ ∼ 6≶
Table 1: Extensive analysis of PDT
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Proof. We first show that for all a ∈ supp( f ), [a]  g. The proof is by induction on the cardinality n of
supp(g) where the case n = 1 is trivial. Assume n > 1, then g can be written as 〈α , [a′],g′〉, where a′
is a generic alternative from supp(g) and g′(a′) = 0. Clearly, the distribution [a] can also be written as
〈α , [a], [a]〉. By assumption a a′ and, since the cardinality of g′ is n−1, by induction [a] g. Then, by
applying Axiom 4 we have [a] g.
Now, the proof is by induction on the cardinality m of supp( f ) where the base case m = 1 has
been proved above. Assume m > 1 and let a ∈ supp( f ), then f can be written as 〈α , [a], f−a〉, where
f−a(a) = 0 and f−a(a′) = f (a
′)
1− f (a) for all a
′ ∈ supp( f ) \ {a}. We already proved that [a]  g and by
induction hypothesis it holds also that f−a  g. Then, by writing g as 〈α ,g,g〉 and applying Axiom 4 we
have that f  g.
From Theorem 2 it is immediate to show that distributions over equivalent alternatives are equivalent
themselves. What if some of the alternatives are incomparable? We show that their distributions are
either equivalent or incomparable, as due to Axiom 6 no strict preference can be derived.
Lemma 1 Let f ,g ∈ ∆(A ) be such that, for all a ∈ supp( f ) and a′ ∈ supp(g), a 6≶ a′. Then, either f 6≶ g
or f ∼ g.
Proof. Let n f = |supp( f )| and ng = |supp(g)|, we proceed by induction on n f + ng. If n f + ng = 2, the
thesis is obviously true. Otherwise, assume w.l.o.g. that n f > 1 and let a ∈ supp( f ). We can write f
as 〈 f (a), [a], f−a〉, where f−a(a) = 0 and f−a(a′) = f (a
′)
1− f (a) for all a
′ ∈ supp( f ) \{a}. Since the support
of f−a is smaller than the one of f , we can apply the inductive hypothesis to the pair f−a,g, obtaining
that either f−a 6≶ g or f−a ∼ g. We can also apply the inductive hypothesis to the pair [a],g, obtaining
that [a] 6≶ g or [a] ∼ g. Assume by contradiction that f ⊲⊳ g for some ⊲⊳∈ {≺,≻}. By Axiom 6, it holds
[a] ⊲⊳ g or f−a ⊲⊳ g, which is a contradiction.
Finally, the following generalization of Lemma 1 shows that alternatives that are either incomparable or
equivalent lead to distributions that are themselves either incomparable or equivalent.
Theorem 3 Let f ,g ∈ ∆(A ) be such that, for all a ∈ supp( f ) and a′ ∈ supp(g), either a ∼ a′ or a 6≶ a′.
Then, f 6≶ g or f ∼ g.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Lemma 1, where only the base case is affected by the
weakened assumption.
5 Conclusions
In this work we challenged the customary decision-theoretic assumption of totality of the preference
relations, on the basis of two real-world scenarios. We proposed a weakening of the classical theory and
proved that it retains several desirable properties, while allowing for incomparable alternatives.
Partial preferences have been already employed in procurement auctions. In [2] second-price auc-
tions have been generalized by considering a bid domain representing information disclosures and two
ad hoc partial preference relations have been defined for modeling the sensitivity of the disclosed data.
Then, in [1] the previous framework has been extended for modeling also service cost, QoS and func-
tional differences, etc. Somewhat surprisingly, it has been shown that extending second price auctions
to partial preferences does not yield truthful mechanisms, since overbidding may be profitable in some
contexts. This means that, in general, partial preferences may significantly change the theoretical prop-
erties of a mechanism and the axiomatization presented in this work enables to uniformly employ them
in the field of Mechanism Design and estimate their impact.
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